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Without Reservation
Gregory F. Jacob*
"I'm going to support [the tobacco treaty]-much to the surprise of many
around the world .... We have no reservations."' With those words, Tommy
Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services, announced that the
United States was prepared to throw its support behind the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control ("FCTC" or the "Convention"). The FCTC is
a World Health Organization-sponsored treaty that was negotiated by the United
States in Geneva beginning in October of 2000 along with over 150 other
participating countries. 2 When the text of the treaty was finalized in February of
2003, the United States' health attach6 in Geneva issued a statement publicly
decrying several of the treaty's provisions.3 But by the time Secretary Thompson
made his remarks in May of the same year, the United States apparently no
longer had any reservations about the treaty at all. This was fortunate indeed for
the United States, for one of the treaty's most controversial provisions was a "no
reservations" clause that had been inserted into the Convention's Article 30 over
the United States' objection.4
Under the standard rules of treaty-making set forth in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, a country joining a multilateral treaty is
permitted to enter "reservations" against certain of the treaty's obligations.
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Greg Jacob is an Attorney Advisor in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel. The
views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect the positions of the United States
government.
Tommy Thompson, Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services, quoted in
Rob Stein and Marc Kaufman, U.S. Backs Pact Curbing Tobacco Use Worldwide, Wash Post Al (May
19, 2003).
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Entering a reservation against an obligation prevents the obligation from
entering into force for the reserving country so long as the reservation is not
fundamentally inconsistent with the treaty's object and purpose.5 This rule of
international law was developed by the International Court of Justice amidst a
boom of multilateral treaty-making in the post-World War II era of the late
1940s and early 1950s. The rule is designed to maximize the number of countries
that are able to join multilateral treaties by affording countries wishing to join
some measure of flexibility to accommodate their local laws and circumstances.'
"No reservations" clauses, however, alter the standard rule by prohibiting
joining nations from in any way altering or disclaiming the treaty's obligations,
even where such alterations would be necessary to conform the treaty to the
requirements of a nation's domestic law or constitution. Because the FCTC
contains a "no reservations" clause, to join the FCTC the United States must
accept it wholesale-every nip, jot, and tuck. Based on the Secretary's remarks, it
appears the United States is prepared to do so.
My personal view is that the FCTC is an imperfect document produced by
a deeply flawed process. That is not to say that the United States should not join
the treaty. But the FCTC is, and was from the outset destined to be, a largely
symbolic document, the primary benefit of which is the raising of worldwide
awareness about the public health epidemic caused by tobacco consumption.
For an international treaty, the FCTC has remarkably little to do with
international relations, and primarily covers matters pertaining purely to
domestic law. Virtually every provision of the treaty could be enacted into law by
willing countries even in the treaty's absence. Indeed, many countries, such as
Canada, Australia, and the United States, had all but a few of the treaty's
provisions in place before the negotiations began and went into the negotiations
with the goal of bringing the rest of the world up to their standards. The United
States, which already has just about the best tobacco control system in the
world, thus stands to gain very little for itself by joining the Convention.
Nevertheless, the signature of the United States on the FCTC would likely have
an important and desirable symbolic effect in encouraging tobacco control
efforts elsewhere in the world, and so long as the costs of joining do not appear
to be too great, there is little reason why its signature should be withheld.
The process by which the treaty was created, however, is another matter.
As a member of the United States delegation that negotiated the FCTC, I
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See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts 19-20, 1155 UN Treaty Ser 331, 336--37
(1980). The United States is not a party to the treaty, but accepts most of its provisions as
reflective of customary international law.
See Advisory Opinion, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
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observed first-hand the process by which the treaty was created That process
proved to be broken, inefficient, and generally inimical to United States interests.
The United States may have managed to dodge a bullet this time around insofar
as the document created by that process-the FCTC-is relatively benign, and
may even prove to be somewhat helpful. In considering whether to join the
treaty, however, the United States ought to be leery of taking any actions that
might be seen as implicitly endorsing the underlying negotiation process or as
sending a signal that the United States would be willing to participate in a similar
negotiation process with respect to other treaties in the future. In this piece, I
will discuss several of the FCTC's more controversial provisions while
highlighting key features of the negotiations that I believe the United States
should strive to avoid being repeated in the future.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE FCTC
Some have dubbed the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control the
world's first "public health treaty"; it is certainly the first treaty to be negotiated
under the auspices of the World Health Organization ("WHO"). The treaty was
initiated by the World Health Assembly in May of 1996,8 but it took the WHO
several years to organize the negotiation process, and the first meeting of the
International Negotiating Body ("INB") did not occur until October of 2000. In
all, six formal negotiation sessions were held (INB1 through INB6) involving
192 participating countries, culminating in agreement on a final text in February
of 2003. The text was formally adopted by the World Health Assembly on May
21, 2003.'
The FCTC project was spurred by a growing recognition that tobacco
consumption is causing a worldwide health epidemic. When the World Health
Assembly voted in 1996 to endorse the initiation of a negotiation process, it
cited statistics indicating that tobacco consumption was at that time already
responsible for approximately 3.5 million deaths each year, and that the annual
death toll would likely rise to 10 million people each year by the decade 20202030.10 By the time WHO Director-General Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland spoke
at INB6 in February of 2003 urging the importance of quickly completing a final
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As a constitutional law expert in the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel, my
assigned task during the negotiations was to ensure that the treaty was ultimately consistent with
the requirements of the United States Constitution. That objective was largely accomplished.
World Health Assembly Res No 49.17, WHO Doc WHA49.17 (1996), available online at
<www.who.int/tobacco/fctc/wha-eb/wha49_1 7/en/> (visited Mar 28, 2004).
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Convention text, she noted that the death toll in the prior year had already risen
to 4.9 million." A "death clock" akin to the national debt clocks with which we
are all familiar was set up in the lobby of the building where the negotiations
were conducted to serve as a constant reminder to the delegates of the severity
of the problem we were facing.
The final text of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control does not
really resemble a "framework convention" at all, but rather is quite detailed and
comprehensive. Among other things, the FCTC purports to establish rules
governing tobacco advertising, product labeling, illicit smuggling, exposure to
second-hand smoke, sales to minors, environmental pollution, tobacco product
contents and emissions, legal liability rules, and even cooperative research
efforts.
II.

PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE STRUCTURE OF

THE WHO NEGOTIATIONS

A quick glance at the list of participants at the meetings of the INB in
Geneva readily sets the stage for the course the negotiations eventually took.
Many of the nations that participated in the negotiations had the resources to
send only one or two delegates. Rather than fill their delegate slots with
professional diplomats or lawyers trained in international law, they instead sent
public health ministers to serve as their negotiating representatives. 2 In some
respects this choice of delegates makes sense, for who could be expected better
to understand the impact that tobacco consumption has on public health than
public health ministers, many of whom were doctors? Yet the meetings of the
INB were not academic conferences involving the presentation of complicated
medical papers or heated debates on the long-term effects of exposure to
second-hand smoke. The object of a treaty negotiation is the making of law, and
that is not something that public health ministers are necessarily particularly well
equipped to do. Many of the delegates had never heard of a "no reservations"
clause, did not know whether economic hardship constitutes a legitimate excuse
under international law for non-performance of treaty obligations, and were
11
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Dr. Gro Harlem Brudentland, Director-General, World Health Organization, Burden of Disease and
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europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/theme/human-social/docs/health/03-03-tobaccospeech -Brundtland.pdf> (visited Mar 28, 2004).
For Palau: Dr. C.T. Otto, Director, Bureau of Public Health Services, Ministry of Health; for
India: Mr. S.K. Naik, Secretary, Department of Health, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare;
for Paraguay: Dr. G. Gamarra, Director, Department of Tobacco and Obstructive, Chronic Lung
Disease, Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare. World Health Organization, List of
Participants, WHO Doc A/FCTC/INB6/DIV/2 Rev 2 at 14, 22 (2003), available online at
<http://www.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/inb6/eafctcinb6d2r2.pdf> (visited Mar 28, 2004).
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unfamiliar with how a "framework" convention with attached protocols is
supposed to be structured. The inexperience of so many of the delegates with
the enterprise of treaty-making, coupled with the inexperience of the WHO
itself, significantly exacerbated other problems inherent in the WHO negotiation
structure.
One troubling dynamic that surfaced early in the negotiations and grew
significantly worse over time was a split between the developing and the
developed world, a split that was strongly encouraged by the WHO's regionbased negotiating structure. The WHO generally divides itself into six regions:
AFRO (Africa), EURO (Europe), EMRO (Eastern Mediterranean-generally,
the Middle East), WPRO (Western Pacific-generally, China, Japan, Australia,
and most Pacific islands), SEARO (South-East Asia), and AMRO/PAHO (the
Pan-American Region).' 3 Before each INB, the WHO sponsored-and in many
instances paid for-regional conferences at which all of the countries of each
region would meet in a regional capital and work out "regional" FCTC positions.
The meetings of the INB replicated this region-based structure, as the regional
groups would conference on a semi-daily basis to discuss whether and to what
extent their regional positions should be modified. AFRO, EMRO, and SEARO
emerged almost immediately as focal points of anti-developed-country
sentiment, but the gulf soon widened as the Latin American and Caribbean
countries of AMRO took to meeting by themselves, to the exclusion of Canada
and the United States. The Pacific Islands of WPRO then followed suit,
excluding China, Australia, and Japan from most of their discussions. The
developed countries, thus excluded from their home regions and effectively
isolated, never banded together to form a coalition of their own except on the
one issue on which they all agreed: no mandatory funding obligations.
To add injury to insult, the United States was actually left footing the bill
for much of this WHO-fostered Balkanization. The regional meetings held
between INBs were ostensibly paid for by the WHO, but 25 percent of the
WHO's budget comes directly from contributions assessed against the United
States, while another 10-15 percent comes indirectly from US agency
contributions to various WHO-sponsored programs. 14 In effect, the United
13
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InternationalRelations, House of Representatives, 105th Cong, 1st Sess 5, 15 (1997) (statement of Dr.
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press/releases/2003/pr030328_l.html> (visited Mar 28, 2004); 149 Cong Rec S 1719, 1719-20
(May 23, 2003) (remarks of Mr. Leahy) (noting United States funding support for WHO disease
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States was paying for the rest of the world to get together and figure out how
best to beat up on it-all the while being excluded from its own regional group's
meetings.
The regional emphasis proved to be highly inefficient and
counterproductive. It might be expected that nations in close proximity to one
another would naturally have some synergy of interests, but could it really be the
case that Australia had more in common with Vietnam or Mongolia than with,
say, the European Union or the United States? Free-form negotiations and an
open exchange of ideas would naturally have produced alliances between
similarly situated countries with common interests, but the regional emphasis of
the WHO structure inhibited the formation of such natural ties. The problem
was further exacerbated by the collective inexperience of the delegates, as many
delegates seemed to simply assume that the region-based structure handed to
them by the WHO was the correct model for how business should be conducted
and consequently made little effort to break out of the regional mold.
My objection is not to the formation of voting blocks in general; they can
at times be an extremely useful tool for magnifying voting power. But the
artificially created voting blocks that were imposed from above by the WHO
merely served to grind the negotiations to a virtual standstill. Negotiation
sessions were neither meaningful nor interactive, but rather devolved into a
forum for regional representatives to read aloud pre-drafted statements
reflecting their region's positions. True give-and-take negotiations were virtually
impossible at these sessions because regional representatives rarely had any
authority to change their region's positions without first conducting another
regional meeting. But in what proved to be a classic chicken-and-egg problem,
when the regional meetings did convene it became clear that the absence of
antecedent discussions and idea exchanges had done little to foster any
understanding of opposing positions, and the regional meetings thus generally
produced a hardening of positions rather than any movement towards
reasonable compromises. The same basic negotiating dynamic could have been
achieved at considerably less expense by canceling the negotiating sessions
altogether and simply having each region post a written statement reflecting its
positions on a bulletin board each morning.
It was readily apparent almost from the outset that the negotiating process
had become dysfunctional, yet there was little impetus from within the INB to
reform the negotiation structure to speed things up. A large number of the
delegates were in Geneva on scholarship from the WHO, which paid virtually all

surveillance); USAID, Integrated Management of Childhood Illness, available online at
<http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/global-health/mch/ch/techareas/imci.html>
(visited Mar
28, 2004) (noting grant support through USAID of the WHO's Integrated Management of
Childhood Illness program).
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of their expenses. For these delegates, there was little pressure from their home
governments to finish the treaty in a time-efficient manner. Not only did
delegations from less developed countries lack incentives to speed up the
process, but they actually instituted measures designed to slow things down.
Because many of these countries did not have enough delegates to staff multiple
simultaneous meetings, they insisted that no more than two negotiating sessions
take place at the same time. This would have been more understandable if
anything was actually getting done at the typically stultifying sessions. However,
the very region-based structure that made the sessions so ineffective also made
the attendance of all of the countries from each region completely unnecessary:
acting as a collective, the regional blocks had more than enough available
representatives to staff multiple meetings. Instead, as many as 150 delegates were
present in the room even for "informal" negotiation sessions, which merely
served to make things even more unproductive and unwieldy.
The only real pressure to stay on schedule came from the WHO Secretariat
itself, which desperately wanted to have the Convention finished before Dr.
Brundtland's term as Director-General expired, as she hoped to leave office with
a completed FCTC as the crown jewel of her administration. At INB4-more
than half-way through the treaty-negotiation process, a time when the
differences between positions are supposed to be narrowing-the INB spent
over half of the time allotted for negotiations adding more than 100 brackets to
an already heavily bracketed text. Watching this train wreck unfold from its
perch on the dais, the Secretariat realized it was in trouble and finally moved to
change the negotiation structure to speed things up. Between INB4 and INB5
the Chairman unilaterally eliminated most of the new brackets by issuing a
consolidated "Chair's text," the primary purpose of which seemed to be to undo
all of the damage that had been done at INB4.15 Furthermore, truly informal
small-sized working groups were finally instituted in the later half of INB5,
despite some grumbling by the developing countries, giving the FCTC at least a
fighting chance at pushing through to the finish line.
Still, the slow pace of early negotiations created a significant crunch for
time at the end, which prevented several key provisions of the treaty from
getting full consideration. Perhaps the best example of this is the Convention's
definitions of "tobacco advertising and promotion" and "tobacco
sponsorship."' 6 The INB did not formally consider these definitions until its
very last meeting, despite the fact that they determine the scope of the
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Convention's critically important and highly controversial tobacco advertising
provisions. Article 1 of the Convention states that 'tobacco advertising and
promotion' means any form of commercial communication, recommendation or
action with the aim, effect or likely effect of promoting a tobacco product or
tobacco use either directly or indirectly.' 7 "Tobacco sponsorship" is defined in
the same article as "any form of contribution to any event, activity or individual
with the aim, effect or likely effect of promoting a tobacco product or tobacco
use either directly or indirectly."' 8 The definition of "tobacco advertising and
promotion" is so broad that it could reasonably be read to encompass the
distribution of stock market circulars portraying a tobacco company in a positive
light, while the definition of "tobacco sponsorship" clearly covers charitable
contributions made by the tobacco industry and probably should be read to
cover political contributions made by private citizens to libertarian organizations
that oppose governmental regulation of smoking. The full significance of these
broad definitions becomes apparent upon a close examination of the
Convention's Article 13, which obligates most countries to ban all of the
activities covered by the definitions and requires those countries that cannot ban
all of the covered activities because of their domestic constitutions (a group that
includes the United States) to impose restrictions on them. 19 Even if we could
restrict charitable contributions by the tobacco industry, why would we want to?
And precisely how, in light of the First Amendment, are we supposed to restrict
political contributions made by private citizens to libertarian organizations?
The delegates that negotiated the text of the definitions knew full well that
they were overbroad. In our informal working group, I pointed out all of the
problematic applications noted above, and not a single delegate disagreed with
my interpretation of the text. Indeed, several delegates agreed with me that the
overbroad definitions would be problematic under their own countries'
constitutions. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to reach any kind of a
compromise on a narrower definition within the time constraints provided. A
large group of developing countries, apparently unhindered by domestic
constitutional protections of freedom of speech, absolutely insisted on retaining
the extremely broad language. It took a minor miracle just to get the word
"commercial" inserted into the definition of "tobacco advertising and
promotion," as many members of the SEARO, EMRO, and AFRO regions
wanted the definition to cover non-commercial speech by actors outside the
tobacco industry. When I pointed out that without the insertion of the word
"commercial" the definition would cover a recommendation between friends to
try a particular brand of cigarette, one delegate expressed astonishment that the
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United States Constitution could possibly protect speech of that nature: "Your
Constitution protects that? What kind of friend would do that, anyway?"
Another delegate approached me in the hallway after the negotiating session and
asked me, "If your Constitution is so horrible, why do you even bother coming
to these negotiations?" With so much energy expended getting the word
"commercial" inserted, there was little impetus left to secure further
improvements to the definitions within the extraordinarily tight time-frame
provided. Knowing full well that the definitions were problematic-but
presumably betting that some creative interpretations could provide most
countries the necessary "out"-the delegates held their collective noses and in
the waning hours of the negotiations passed the definitions. The United States
objected, expressing some bafflement that the INB would adopt definitions that
it knew were wrong.
III. NGO INFLUENCE
The NGOs in Geneva were well organized and outspoken. Infact, Action
on Smoking and Health ("ASH"), Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids, and an
assortment of other NGOs banded together to form an umbrella organization
called the "Framework Convention Alliance." The Alliance sponsored seminars
for the delegates, lobbied them in the hallways, and put out an "Alliance
Bulletin" every morning designed to sway delegates' positions on various
proposed treaty provisions. Much of the information distributed by the NGOs
was valuable and accurate, but some NGOs were not above stooping to underhanded and manipulative tactics. For example, during INB5 I had to file a
complaint with the WHO Secretariat when I caught members of Infact
deliberately attempting to listen in on a private cell phone conversation I was
having with the White House. I received the call while I was in the main
negotiation chamber and left the room so that I could talk freely without
disturbing others and without being overheard. As I left the room with the
phone to my ear, however, a member of Infact began to tail me, forcing me to
move into a narrow corridor where it would be difficult to follow me
inconspicuously. I finished my conversation from an alcove just off of the
corridor, only to find as I emerged at the end of my call that another Infact
member had been sent through the corridor from the opposite direction and
was kneeling down around the corner, studiously taking notes. I felt like I was
trapped in a "Spy vs. Spy" comic strip from Mad magazine, but apparently some
members of the NGOs believed so fervently in the rightness of their cause that
in their minds the employment of some highly questionable tactics was fully
justified.
Nor were the various flyers and other publications distributed by the
NGOs free from some occasional truth-twisting. One of the key battles during
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the negotiations concerned whether the FCTC should require all parties to enact
a comprehensive ban on all tobacco advertising-a provision that the United
States could not agree to because such a ban is prohibited by the First
Amendment.2" Despite the fact that domestic constitutional constraints would
likely prevent many countries from joining the treaty if a total advertising ban
was adopted, the NGOs nevertheless pushed for it hard, claiming that "[t]he
only credible policy with a secure evidence base is a complete and
comprehensive ban on all direct and indirect tobacco advertising, sponsorship
and promotion."'" It was their prerogative, of course, to try to push the United
States out of the treaty if they wanted to. But they went too far, in my view,
when they distributed flyers in which they made the bogus claim that the United
States was exaggerating its constitutional constraints, specifically alleging that the
United States had never attempted a comprehensive ban on all tobacco
advertising and that such a ban stood a good chance of being upheld by the
United States Supreme Court if it was enacted. I had to spend the better part of
two days after that flyer was distributed explaining to other delegations that just
two years before, the Supreme Court had struck down a Massachusetts law that
prohibited the advertising of tobacco products on billboards within 1,000 feet of
schools.22 While the NGOs may technically have been correct that the United
States has never attempted to enact a law comprehensively banning all tobacco
advertising, it stretched credulity to claim that the Supreme Court would even
consider upholding such a ban after so recently invalidating the rather modest
advertising restrictions at issue in Lorillard.
These tactics would not have been so disturbing if they had not had much
of an effect, but the inexperience of many of the delegates rendered them ripe
for capture by sophisticated NGOs. Many of the delegations that did not have
legal counsel of their own with them in Geneva ended up turning to the NGOs
as their primary source of information about treaty law and about the domestic
constitutional constraints facing countries like the United States. The NGOs
thus exerted tremendous influence over the course of the negotiations. By the
time I first became involved in the negotiations, at INB3 in November of 2001,
the persuasive power of the NGOs was already well established. The negotiating
rules did not permit the NGOs to be present in rooms where informal
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negotiations were being conducted,2 3 but this rule proved to be about as
effective at keeping the NGOs out of the negotiating process as campaign
finance laws are at keeping the money out of politics. 24 As proposals were made
on the floor regarding key treaty provisions, delegates of various nations would
leave the room to inform the NGOs and to consult with them regarding what
positions they should take. Some of the most dramatic NGO influence would
occur overnight, as NGOs would meet with select delegates over dinner to plot
out their strategy for the next day. The NGOs complained vociferously about a
supposed tobacco industry lobbying campaign aimed at sinking the Convention,
but other than a couple of representatives of the duty-free lobby, the tobacco
industry was nowhere to be found. By contrast, the NGOs worked the halls
masterfully and, for all intents and purposes, filled the roles of deeply
entrenched Washington insiders.
Please don't get me wrong: I am no fan of the tobacco industry, and I
greatly sympathized with the cause espoused by the NGOs in Geneva. Setting
my own policy preferences aside, however, it is clear to me that it is not in the
interests of the United States to participate in negotiations where NGOs exert
tremendous influence over large numbers of delegates not because they are right
on matters of substance, but rather because they are providing the only pro
bono legal services available to delegates with no legal experience of their own.
In filling this role, the NGOs certainly did not act as disinterested legal advisers,
and along the way more than one delegation was hoodwinked into believing the
NGOs' all-too-frequently distorted versions of the truth.
IV. ULTERIOR AGENDAS
A treaty is generally defined as an agreement between nations. One of the
phenomena produced by the predominance of health ministers at the INBs in
Geneva, however, was that the United States was placed in the position of
negotiating not with foreign states but rather with foreign health ministriesministries that were not necessarily pursuing policies favored by their home
23
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governments. It quickly became clear that many of the delegates had
experienced frustration in the past in trying to persuade their home governments
to adopt strong anti-tobacco measures. These delegates saw the FCTC as an
opportunity to do an end-run around their governments by inserting strong antitobacco measures into the Convention and then relying on international political
pressure to force their governments to join it. Some of the delegates openly
admitted their ulterior agendas, making plaintive appeals from the floor of the
negotiations that strong language be inserted in the treaty so that they could
force the hand of their government back home. This dynamic was particularly
apparent in the debate over the "no reservations" clause, as a surprisingly large
number of delegates argued in favor of the provision on the grounds that if
reservations were allowed, their own government would be likely to take some. I
felt as though I had stepped into the Geneva edition of the Twilight Zone, as I
watched the representatives of governments that apparently would have liked to
take reservations to the Convention deliberately acting to deprive their
governments of the opportunity to do so.
Another not-so-secret agenda pursued by several countries, mostly from
the SEARO region, was a campaign to get provisions inserted into the treaty
that would aid them in ongoing trade-related litigation that had been brought
against them by the tobacco industry. WTO rules give countries broad discretion
to adopt health-related measures so long as those measures are even-handed and
non-discriminatory. 25 For example, there would be no problem if a country
banned all tobacco imports as part of a comprehensive ban of all tobacco sales
within its territory, but there would be a problem if a country banned all tobacco
imports as a means of protecting their domestic tobacco industry. Several
countries had been successfully sued by the industry for adopting supposedly
health-protective measures that were actually domestic-industry protective.
Sounding the battle cry "health trumps trade," these countries made express
appeals during the negotiations for help from the rest of the world in their
titanic struggle against the villainous "tobacco industry"-an appeal that almost
seemed sympathetic until one realized that it was only the foreign tobacco
industry that they were crusading against, while they were busily propping up
their domestic companies. One of my favorite proposals in this vein was a
provision that would have allowed countries to enforce their advertising bans by
banning the imports of violators. The trick is that the types of violations that the
provision's proponents had in mind were, for example, Marlboro logos showing
25
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up on television sets in India through the auspices of ESPN because they were
painted onto race cars appearing in the Indianapolis 500. In other words, the
provision would have allowed India to ban Marlboro imports simply because
Marlboro sponsored a race car in Indiana, thousands of miles from Indian
borders. Most proposals of this nature were ultimately beaten back, but the
Convention does include a handful of provisions that were designed by their
sponsors to aid them in trade litigation.26
One result of the proliferation of ulterior agendas at the INBs is that the
"Framework Convention on Tobacco Control" is not really a framework
convention at all. A framework convention is supposed to broadly state general
governing principles on which all countries can agree and then spin off related
optional protocols that contain more specific substantive obligations. 27 Although
the United States had initially joined the negotiations on the understanding that
the goal was to produce such a convention, the framework model did not really
serve the needs of the NGOs, the health ministers who were looking to force
the hands of their own governments, or the trade lawyers who were looking for
a little extra help in the trade courts. Figuring that international political pressure
would push countries into signing the main Convention but would not extend
far enough to push them into optional protocols, the groups in question
undertook to pack the Convention full of all the substantive provisions that
were on their wish lists. They also successfully banded together to oppose the
negotiation of any protocols until the main Convention was finished in its
entirety, thereby creating the illusion that any details left out of the Convention
might never be addressed at all. Consequently, the FCTC bears less of a
resemblance to a true framework convention than it does to the Napoleonic
Code.
The conversion of the "framework convention" into a code for tobacco
regulation may ultimately prove to be rather unfortunate. The Convention is
probably too detailed to justify the negotiation of further protocols, yet many
important provisions had to be watered down to accommodate the needs and
domestic circumstances of the more than 150 different countries that were
negotiating the treaty. For example, countries that wanted a total ban on all
tobacco advertising could easily have promulgated an optional protocol
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requiring such a ban, and-if the claims made by a majority of the delegates in
Geneva are to be believed-most of the countries in the world would have
signed on to it. Because advertising was substantively addressed in full in the
main text of the Convention, however, the advertising article is riddled with
caveats and exceptions that were inserted to accommodate an array of
constitutional and economic feasibility concerns. 28 It is possible that this
unhappy middle ground might have been avoided if the developed countries, or
even the United States acting on its own, had made a strong play to hold the
INB to its mandate to produce a framework convention, perhaps by threatening
to leave the negotiations when the FCTC began to be pushed in the direction of
becoming something else entirely.
V. LANGUAGE MATTERS!
Part of the NGO strategy at the negotiations was to vilify the United States
for its supposed attempts to "water down" the Convention. In one editorial,
NGO members wrote that they and the developing countries had "saved the
FCTC from being gutted by a handful of developed countries which have no
intention of ever implementing most of its provisions.,, 29 The NGOs also
distributed pamphlets, including one entitled "Cowboy Diplomacy," urging the
delegates to ignore the United States on the grounds that the Bush
Administration does not take international law seriously and probably was not
going to join the Convention anyway.
The reality is that the United States has such an excellent tobacco control
system that it had already implemented all of the provisions of the Convention
save one-a requirement that health warnings take up at least 30 percent of the
space on all tobacco packaging 3 -before the negotiation of the Convention
even started. The United States viewed the FCTC negotiations as an opportunity
to bring the rest of the world up to its standards. The problem that the United
States faced at the negotiations is that it takes its international law obligations
perhaps more seriously than any other country in the world. It is the policy of
the State Department, for example, never to ratify a treaty until all of the
domestic legislation necessary to fulfill the United States' treaty obligations has
already been enacted. Because the United States takes its obligations seriously, it
is intensely interested in the language in which those obligations are couched.
For example, the United States was mercilessly pounded by the European
Union at the negotiations for pushing for language regarding exposure to
28
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second-hand smoke that would reflect the practical realities of implementing
such provisions. The EU insisted that the Convention needed to contain
"strong" language reflective of the seriousness of the health risk in question and
pushed a provision that would have required all state parties to adopt measures
protecting people from exposure to tobacco smoke in "all public places."
Precisely how they planned to protect people from exposure to tobacco smoke
in public places such as street corners and public parks, they could not say.
Nevertheless, they generally seemed untroubled by their inability to fulfill the
requirements of the text and lambasted the United States for attempting to limit
the obligation to enclosed spaces where protective measures could realistically be
implemented. The United States was also pilloried for attempting to limit the
obligation to protecting non-smokers. Again, no one was ever able to explain to
me how you protect someone who is smoking from exposure to tobacco smoke.
At any rate, there was certainly a delicious irony to being pounded on by
the EU on the issue of exposure to second-hand smoke, as you can't walk into a
restaurant in Geneva, or virtually any other place in Europe, without being hit by
a billowing cloud of tobacco smoke. When I suggested to several EU members
that if they really wanted strong language in the Convention perhaps we should
consider banning all smoking in bars and restaurants, they immediately blanched
and indicated that they did not think that a provision of that nature would be
necessary.
The recurring problem that the United States faces in treaty negotiations is
that its commitment to the complete fulfillment of its treaty obligations requires
it to ensure that the text of its obligations is realistic, while many countries are
not particularly concerned with the details of implementation and just want the
treaties to sound good. Time and again the United States' FCTC delegation was
urged to accept overbroad language and then to resolve its difficulties with it (as
many others planned to do-nod, nod; wink, wink) by creatively interpreting its
way out of the overbroad obligations later. Time and again, the United States
refused to adopt this model because it does not believe that is the way that treaty
law is supposed to work.
The NGOs argued that the United States has no intention of implementing
the provisions of the Convention. In fact, it has already implemented all but one.
I wonder if the NGOs can identify any of their champions of the developing
world-the countries that pushed for even broader language than what was
eventually included in the Convention-that can say the same.
VI. CONCLUSION
The FCTC is far from a perfect document. Nevertheless, I believe that it
has done a great deal of good by raising awareness of the global health epidemic
caused by tobacco consumption and by establishing model measures that can be
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used by all countries to combat the problem. There may thus be good and
sufficient reasons for the United States to join the Convention, and it will
certainly be under a great deal of international and domestic pressure to do so.
But whatever course of action the United States ultimately takes with respect to
the FCTC, it should also take whatever measures are necessary to avoid the
replication of the FCTC negotiation process. That process may have managed to
produce a diamond-in-the-rough this time, but it is fraught with pitfalls for the
future.
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